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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Cesar Antonio Sepulveda appeals from the judgment entered upon the
jury verdict finding him guilty of felony intimidating a witness and misdemeanor
domestic battery, injury to child and two counts of attempted violation of a no
contact order.
After oral argument, Sepulveda requested supplemental briefing. (See
Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Briefing, filed June 15, 2016.) This Court
ordered supplemental briefing “regarding the continuing validity of Idaho’s
‘pleading theory’ for determining whether an offense is an included offense of
another for double jeopardy in light of the repeal of I.C. section 18-301.” (See
June 29, 2016 Order Granting Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Briefing.)
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously laid out
in the State’s Respondent’s brief.

(See Resp. Br., pp. 1-8.) The facts and

course of proceedings related to the issues not subject to the supplemental
briefing will not be repeated, but are incorporated herein to the extent necessary.
The facts and course of proceedings relevant to the supplemental briefing are
summarized below.
The state charged Sepulveda in Case No. CR-FE-2013-008132 with
attempted strangulation and misdemeanor injury to child. (R., pp. 8-9, 49-51, 5658, 166-167.) The magistrate issued a no contact order preventing Sepulveda
from having any contact with L.M. (R., p. 14.) The no contact order was later

1

amended to prevent Sepulveda from having contact with child victims as well.
(R., p. 48.)
While Sepulveda was in custody he attempted to contact L.M. several
times through different third parties and repeatedly tried to get L.M. to say the
allegations against him were false or else not to show up for court. (R., pp. 246247.)

These multiple calls were recorded.

(See id.)

The state charged

Sepulveda in Case No. CR-FE-2014-00011891 with felony intimidating,
impeding, influencing or preventing attendance of a witness and with two counts
of attempted violation of a no contact order. (Id.)
The Information, as amended, states:
COUNT I
That the Defendant CESAR ANTONIO SEPULVEDA, on or
between the 29th day of December, 2013 and the 14th day of
January, 2014, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did willfully
intimidate, influence, impede, deter, obstruct, or prevent, and or did
attempt to intimidate, influence, impede, deter, obstruct, or prevent
a witness, potential witness, and/or person the Defendant believes
to be a witness, from testifying freely, fully and truthfully in a
criminal proceeding, to-wit: Ada County case number CR-FE-20130018132, in which the Defendant was charged with the crimes of
Attempted Strangulation and Possession of a Controlled
Substance, by asking another person and/or persons to speak with
[L.M.] and ask her to tell the court that she injured herself, that the
allegations of attempted strangulation are false, and/or that her
medications are to blame for what happened, and/or to direct her
not to appear for court.[2]
1

The two cases, Case No. CR-FE-2013-008132 and Case No. CR-FE-20140001189, were consolidated. (6/20/14 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 13-21.) Case No. CR-FE2014-0001189 is contained in the clerk’s record from pages 241-474.
2
The district court, based on Sepulveda’s motion, struck the “attempt” language
from Count I. (8/8/14 Tr., p. 47, L. 10 – p. 48, L. 13.) The language “and or did
attempt to intimidate, influence, impede, deter, obstruct, or prevent” was struck
from the Information. (Compare R., p. 278 with 8/11/14 Tr., p. 122, L. 8 – p. 123,
L. 1.)
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COUNT II
That the Defendant CESAR ANTONIO SEPULVEDA, on or about
the 30th day of December, 2013, in the County of Ada, State of
Idaho, attempted to have contact with [L.M.] in violation of a no
contact order issued in Ada County case number CR-FE-20130018132, where the Defendant was charged with the offense of
Attempted Strangulation, by calling [L.M.’s] sister and asking her to
pass certain messages on to [L.M.].
COUNT III
That the Defendant CESAR ANTONIO SEPULVEDA, on or about
the 2nd day of January, 2014, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho,
attempted to have contact with [L.M.] in violation of a no contact
order issued in Ada County case number CR-FE-2013-0018132,
where the Defendant was charged with the offense of Attempted
Strangulation, by calling a Lisa Cameron and asking her to contact
L.M. on his behalf.
(R., p. 278.)
After a trial, the jury found Sepulveda guilty of domestic battery; injury to a
child; intimidating, impeding, influencing or preventing attendance of a witness;
and the two counts of attempted violation of a no contact order. (R., pp. 183184, 404-405.)
The district court entered judgment and sentenced Sepulveda to five
years with three years fixed.

(R., pp. 456-461.)

The district court retained

jurisdiction. (Id.) Sepulveda filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 236-239,
463-466.)
On appeal, Sepulveda raised, for the first time, a claim that felony
intimidating a witness was a lesser included crime of misdemeanor attempted
violation of a no contact order and, as a result, his convictions for both crimes
violated his protections against double jeopardy. (See Appellant’s Br., pp. 22-
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27.)

Sepulveda did not argue that his convictions ran afoul of the well-

established double jeopardy protections as articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (See id.)
Instead, Sepulveda only claimed that his convictions violated double jeopardy
because they ran afoul of the “pleading theory.” (See id.) The state responded
by showing that intimidation of a witness is not the means by which Sepulveda
committed attempted violation of a no contact order, and thus his convictions did
not violate double jeopardy under the pleading theory. (See Resp. Br., pp. 2937.)
At oral argument this Court questioned whether the “pleading theory” is
still valid Idaho law after the repeal of Idaho Code § 18-301. (See Appellant’s
Supp. Br., p. 1.) Sepulveda requested supplemental briefing on the issue and
this Court granted his motion. (See June 29, 2016 Order Granting Motion for
Leave to File Supplemental Briefing.)
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ISSUE
Sepulveda states the double jeopardy issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court violated Mr. Sepulveda’s constitutional right to
be free from double jeopardy under the Idaho Constitution by entering
convictions and imposing sentences for each charge in the 2014 case
when one of those charges was alleged as a means by which each of the
other two charges was committed.
(Supplemental Br., p. 2.)
For the purposes of the supplemental briefing, the state rephrases the
double jeopardy issue as:
Is Sepulveda’s claim that his convictions violate his state constitutional
right to be free from double jeopardy under the “pleading theory” without merit
because the “pleading theory” was rooted in statute, not the double jeopardy
provisions of the Idaho Constitution?
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ARGUMENT
The “Pleading Theory” Was Based On Statutory Interpretation And Did Not
Create A Separate Double Jeopardy Right Under The Idaho Constitution
A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal, Sepulveda argues his convictions for felony

intimidation of a witness and two counts of misdemeanor attempted violation of a
no contact order violate his constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy
under the “pleading theory.” Sepulveda’s argument fails.
The United States Supreme Court does not utilize a “pleading theory” to
evaluate a double jeopardy claim under the United States Constitution. Nor have
Idaho Courts articulated clear precedent or circumstances unique to the state of
Idaho that require the Idaho double jeopardy provisions to deviate from those in
the United States Constitution.

Rather, the “pleading theory” upon which

Sepulveda relies was based upon the interpretation of Idaho Code §§ 18-301
and 19-2312.

Because the “pleading theory” does not articulate a separate

double jeopardy protection under the Idaho Constitution, Sepulveda cannot meet
his burden of demonstrating fundamental error. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho
209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010) (defendant alleging error for first time on
appeal must demonstrate, inter alia, clear violation of unwaived constitutional
right).
B.

Standard Of Review
“It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for
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appeal.” State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000).
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an
alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245
P.3d at 979.
Whether a defendant’s prosecution complies with the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is a question of law subject to free review.
State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63, 14 P.3d 378, 383 (Ct. App. 2000). The
interpretation and application of a statute is also a question of law subject to de
novo review. State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 946, 265 P.3d 1155, 1158 (Ct. App.
2011).
C.

The Blockburger Test Is The Only Test Applicable To The Double
Jeopardy Provision Of The United States Constitution
“The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States and Idaho

Constitutions affords a defendant three basic protections. It protects against a
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution
for the same offense after conviction, and multiple criminal punishments for the
same offense.” State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 370, 256 P.3d 776, 778 (2011)
(citations omitted). Whether offenses are the “same” for the purpose of a double
jeopardy analysis is a question of legislative intent. Garrett v. United States, 471
U.S. 773, 778 (1985) (“Where the same conduct violates two statutory
provisions, the first step in the double jeopardy analysis is to determine whether
the legislature . . . intended that each violation be a separate offense.”).
If [the legislature] intended that there be only one offense – that is,
a defendant could be convicted under either statutory provision for
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a single act, but not under both – there would be no statutory
authorization for a subsequent prosecution after conviction of one
of the two provisions, and that would end the double jeopardy
analysis.
Garrett, 471 U.S. at 778.
Conversely, if “the legislative intent is clear from the face of the statute or
the legislative history” that a defendant can be convicted and punished under
different statutes for the same conduct, there can be no double jeopardy
violation. Id. at 778-779; Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983) (“With
respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy
Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater
punishment than the legislature intended.”).

Stated another way, “[t]here is

nothing in the Constitution which prevents [a legislature] from punishing
separately each step leading to the consummation of a transaction which it has
power to prohibit and punishing also the completed transaction.” Garrett, 471
U.S. at 779 (quoting Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)).
In Blockburger, the United States Supreme Court announced a test of
statutory construction to use in determining legislative intent in evaluating a
double jeopardy claim.

Garrett, 471 U.S. at 778-779 (“The rule stated in

Blockburger was applied as a rule of statutory construction to help determine
legislative intent.”).

The Blockburger test provides:

“where the same act or

transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to
be applied to determine whether there have been two offenses or only one for
double jeopardy purposes is whether each statutory provision requires proof of
an additional fact which the other does not.” Corbus, 151 Idaho at 371, 256 P.3d
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at 779 (citation omitted). Under the federal constitution, if a statutory analysis
survives the Blockburger test, there can be no double jeopardy violation. United
States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105 (1985).
D.

The Idaho Supreme Court Has Not Adopted A Double Jeopardy Standard
In Direct Conflict With The Double Jeopardy Analysis Of The United
States Supreme Court
Because the Fifth Amendment analysis is controlled by Blockburger, the

question becomes whether the Idaho constitutional analysis is different.
Although Idaho courts are not obligated to follow United States Supreme Court
precedent in interpreting our state constitution, see State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho
981, 987, 842 P.2d 660, 666 (1992), in those cases where the Idaho Supreme
Court has determined the Idaho Constitution provides greater protections than
the United States Constitution, the Court articulates the reasons why. See State
v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 88-89, 90 P.3d 306, 313-314 (2004) (discussing cases
and noting that, in those cases, the Court “provided greater protection to Idaho
citizens based on the uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our longstanding jurisprudence”); cf. State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 406-407, 825
P.2d 501, 503-504 (1992) (declining to consider claim that Idaho Constitution
affords greater protection absent supporting argument).

The Idaho Supreme

Court “recently reiterated that in order for the Idaho Constitution’s interpretation
to deviate from the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, there must be clear
precedent to that effect or circumstances unique to the state of Idaho or its
Constitution that would compel such a result.” State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884,
892, 354 P.3d 446, 454 (2015).
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Nothing in the line of cases that apply the “pleading theory” has ever
articulated clear precedent or unique circumstances that compel a deviation from
the well-established double jeopardy protections contained in the United States
Constitution.

Sepulveda even appears to partially concede this point.

(See

Appellant’s Supp. Br., p. 12 (“Thus, even though Reichenberg and Berglund
found no justification for additional double jeopardy protections in those specific
cases, that does not mean Idaho’s double jeopardy provision will not provide
additional protections in all circumstances.”).)
In Corbus, supra, the Idaho Court of Appeals discussed a series of Idaho
Supreme Court cases and concluded “the Court has not been entirely consistent
in its application of either the Blockburger test or the pleading theory in double
jeopardy cases.” Corbus, 151 Idaho at 374, 256 P.3d at 782. The so-called
“pleading theory” of double jeopardy essentially converts a test of statutory
construction under Blockburger into one of prosecutorial intent.

Such a

departure is unwarranted, particularly given that the Court has never expressly
articulated any reason to deviate from the analytical framework used in
Blockburger, and the reason for the departure appears to be based on a statute
that does not relate to the protections guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
Reference to a “pleading theory” of double jeopardy appears to have its
genesis in State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 614 P.2d 970 (1980). At issue in
Thompson was “whether the charge of assault with a deadly weapon is a lesser
included offense in a charge of attempted robbery, as alleged herein, such as to
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preclude conviction under the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment of
the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution.” Id. at 433, 614 P.2d
at 973. With respect to the Fifth Amendment, the Court, quoting Brown v. Ohio,
432 U.S. 161 (1977), stated:

“It has long been understood that separate

statutory crimes need not be identical either in constituent elements or in actual
proof in order to be the same within the meaning of the constitutional
prohibition.” Thompson, 101 Idaho at 433, 614 P.2d at 973. The Court then
noted that “[m]any jurisdictions have expanded the definition of lesser included
offenses beyond the statutory theory and utilize what is called the ‘indictment’ or
‘pleading’ theory,” and stated, “Idaho has adopted this pleading approach both
by statute and by case law.”

Id. at 433-434, 614 P.2d at 973-974 (citing

I.C. § 19-2312 and cases).
To the extent the Court in Thompson used Brown v. Ohio, as a platform
for applying a test more lenient than Blockburger, it must be noted that the
United States Supreme Court, in fact, applied the Blockburger statutory analysis
in Brown in concluding that joyriding was a “lesser included offense” of auto theft
because it was “clearly not the case that each statute requires proof of a fact
which the other does not.” 432 U.S. at 167 (citation and quotations omitted).
The Court, consistent with Blockburger, also acknowledged the result would
have been different had the state legislature “provided that joyriding is a separate
offense for each day in which a motor vehicle is operated without the owner’s
consent.” Id. at 169 n.8. Thus, Brown does not support a broader pleading
theory analysis under the Fifth Amendment.
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Sepulveda argues that Thompson created the pleading theory as a test
for assessing whether a double jeopardy violation occurred under the Idaho
Constitution.

(See Appellant’s Supp. Br., pp. 5-7.)

Sepulveda bases his

argument on the structure of Thompson opinion. (See Appellant’s Supp. Br.,
p. 6.) However, the actual analysis in Thompson, combined with the case law on
which the Thompson holding was based, reveals that Sepulveda’s argument is
misplaced.
The Court in Thompson did not articulate any particular reason why the
state constitutional protection against double jeopardy in Idaho would be greater
than that found under the federal constitution. Rather, the Court in Thompson
simply noted that Idaho “has adopted [a] pleading approach both by statute and
by case law.” 101 Idaho at 433-434, 614 P.2d at 973-974. The statute to which
the Court referred is I.C. § 19-2312, which reads:

“The jury may find the

defendant guilty of any offense, the commission of which is necessarily included
in that with which he is charged in the indictment, or of an attempt to commit the
offense.” This statute does not support a “pleading theory” of double jeopardy.
The “case law” referenced by the Court in Thompson consists of three
cases that interpreted Idaho statutes regarding statutory double jeopardy and
lesser included offenses. See id. (citing State v. Anderson, 82 Idaho 293, 352
P.2d 972 (1960); State v. Hall, 86 Idaho 63, 383 P.2d 602 (1963); State v.
Blacksten, 86 Idaho 401, 387 P.2d 467 (1963)). All three of the cases relied
upon by Thompson either interpret Idaho Code § 18-301 or § 19-2312 and none
create a separate constitutional test. Anderson holds:
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We therefore hold, in our desire to clear the confusion which has
arisen in the premises, that pursuant to I.C. § 19–2312, any
offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in that
charged in the indictment or information, is an included offense;
that, therefore, it is proper for an accused to request, and for the
trial court to give, an instruction permitting a conviction of such an
included offense, if there is sufficient evidence to support a
conviction of the included offense.
Anderson, 82 Idaho at 303, 352 P.2d at 978.
Hall explained that Idaho Code § 18-301 provides broader protections
than constitutional double jeopardy:
Our statutory provision against double jeopardy is as follows:
‘An act or omission which is made punishable in different
ways by different provisions of this code may be punished
under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be
punished under more than one; an acquittal or conviction
and sentence under either one bars a prosecution for the
same act or omission under any other.’ I.C. § 18-301.
We have said that this statute enlarges the scope of the
constitutional provision against double jeopardy in that it prohibits
double punishment ‘for the same act or omission’ and is not limited
to the ‘same offense.’ State v. Randolph, 61 Idaho 456, 102 P.2d
913.
Giving the statute its broadest possible application, it is not a bar to
the present prosecution for robbery because both the robbery and
the murder did not arise out of the same ‘act or omission.’
Hall, 86 Idaho at 74-75, 383 P.2d at 609-610 (overruled by Sivak v. State, 112
Idaho 197, 206-208, 731 P.2d 192, 211-213 (1986)).
Finally, Blacksten examined lesser included offenses in the context of
Idaho statutes:
In this case the information charged an aggravated battery and
further alleged that it ‘was committed by said defendant, as
aforesaid, with a premeditated design and by means calculated
and likely to inflict great bodily injury.’ Thus, the information was
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sufficient to charge an aggravated assault as well as aggravated
battery. The assault having been alleged as the manner and
means of the commission of the aggravated battery, it was an
included offense and the information, therefore, was not
duplicitous. I.C. §§ 19-2312, 19-1413 (repealed 1963 S.L., c. 159),
19-1703; State v. Anderson, 82 Idaho 293, 352 P.2d 972; State v.
Wall, 73 Idaho 142, 248 P.2d 222; State v. Petty, 73 Idaho 136,
248 P.2d 218.
Blacksten, 86 Idaho at 411, 387 P.2d at 472 (footnote omitted). Thompson, and
the three primary cases upon which Thompson relied, articulated interpretations
of Idaho statutes, not the creation of new double jeopardy rights.
The only explicit reference in Thompson to the Court’s departure from
Blockburger is found in a footnote where the Court states: “Blockburger sets
forth the minimum standards required so that the fifth amendment prohibition
against double jeopardy is not violated. The[] cases [relied upon by the state] do
not stand for the proposition that only the Blockburger test is relevant in Idaho.”
Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435 n.5, 614 P.2d at 975 n.5. While the Court in
Thompson clearly did not think Blockburger was the only “relevant” test in Idaho,
the articulated basis for the Court’s departure from Blockburger was statutory as
reflected in its reliance on I.C. § 19-2312.3
Sepulveda argues that the “pleading theory” became a constitutional test
because some version of Idaho Code § 19-2312 existed at the time of the
drafting of the Idaho Constitution. (See Appellant’s Supp. Br., pp. 8-10.) Even if
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I.C. § 19-2312 provides that a defendant may be convicted of any offense
“which is necessarily included in that with which he is charged in the indictment,
or of an attempt to commit the offense.” This statute relates to due process
(when a defendant may be convicted of an included offense at trial), not double
jeopardy. Moreover, nothing in this statute is inconsistent with the Blockburger
test.
14

Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution is interpreted in light of the common law
and statutes then existing at the time of its drafting, see e.g., Green, 158 Idaho
at 889, 354 P.3d at 541, the “pleading theory” is not contained within that statute.
The “pleading theory” was articulated by the Thompson Court – many decades
after the Idaho Constitution was drafted.
Further, interpreting I.C. § 19-2312 as imposing a “pleading theory”
analysis upon a double jeopardy claim not only interferes with the enforcement
of separate crimes as they have been defined by the legislature, it is inconsistent
with express legislative acts regarding double jeopardy. In addition to relying on
I.C. § 19-2312, the Court in Thompson also cited I.C. §18-301, which provided:
An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by
different provisions of this code may be punished under either of
such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than
one; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under either one bars
prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.
Reliance on I.C. § 18-301 for a broader interpretation of double jeopardy
in Thompson was understandable because when that statute was in effect it had
“been held to provide a greater scope of protection than the constraints of double
jeopardy found in the Idaho and United States Constitutions.” State v. Seamons,
126 Idaho 809, 811, 892 P.2d 484, 486 (1995).

The legislature, however,

repealed I.C. § 18-301 in 1995, suggesting it did not intend to afford greater
protections than the state or federal constitutions.

As such, any continued

reliance on I.C. § 18-301 as a source of greater state constitutional protection is
no longer valid.
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The Idaho Appellate Court published opinions, post-1995 repeal of Idaho
Code § 18-301, that cite to the “pleading theory” do not provide a constitutional
basis for the “pleading theory.” These cases simply cite to a line of cases that
originated in statutory interpretation. See State v. Curtis, 130 Idaho 522, 524,
944 P.2d 119, 121 (1997) (utilizing the pleading theory within the context of
I.C. § 19-2312 to determine whether an offense is a lesser included offense);
State v. Rosencrantz, 130 Idaho 666, 668, 946 P.2d 628, 630 (1997) (citing to
Curtis to hold that defendant did not meet the first prong of the pleading theory);
State v. Payne, 134 Idaho 423, 424, 3 P.3d 1251, 1252 (2000) (citing to Curtis to
hold that offense was not lesser included); State v. Matalamaki, 139 Idaho 341,
343, 79 P.3d 162, 164 (Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that, based on I.C. § 19-2312
and Curtis, a particular offense may be a lesser included offense under the
“pleading theory” or “statutory theory”); State v. Rae, 139 Idaho 650, 653, 84
P.3d 586, 589 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing Curtis for the proposition that a crime can
be a lesser included offense under either the “pleading theory” or the “statutory
theory”); State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 123, 127, 138 P.3d 323, 327 (Ct. App.
2005), aff’d, 143 Idaho 108, 138 P.3d 308 (2006) (holding that under Curtis and
I.C. § 19-2312 a crime can be lesser included offense under either the “pleading
theory” or the “statutory theory”); State v. Cochran, 149 Idaho 688, 691, 239 P.3d
793, 796 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Rae and I.C. § 19-2312 for the proposition that
the “pleading theory” is one of two theories to determine whether a crime is a
lesser included offense); Corbus, 151 Idaho at 375, 256 P.3d at 783 (“It is not
clear from existing precedent whether the Blockburger test, the pleading theory
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used in Thompson, or the pleading theory used in Stewart, Pizzuto, and Sivak
should properly be applied in this case.”); State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 529,
261 P.3d 519, 523 (2011) (citing Curtis for proposition that the “pleading theory”
can be used to determine a lesser included offense); State v. McKinney, 153
Idaho 837, 841, 291 P.3d 1036, 1040 (2013) (citing Thompson for proposition
that Idaho has adopted the “pleading theory” to determine if a crime is a lesser
included offense); State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 8, 304 P.3d 276, 283 (2013) (citing
Flegel); State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654, 658 n.3, 330 P.3d 400, 404 n.3 (Ct. App.
2014), review denied Aug. 15, 2014 (citing Thompson for the proposition that the
Idaho Constitution utilizes a “pleading theory” to determine if an offense is a
lesser included offense)4; State v. Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho 647, 648, 339
P.3d 372, 373 (2014) (citing Curtis, Flegel, Thompson, and Sivak for the
“pleading theory”); State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 368 P.3d 621, 624 (2016)
(citing Sanchez-Castro for the “pleading theory”); State v. Weatherly, 160 Idaho
302, __, __ P.3d __ (Ct. App. 2016) (citing McKinney and Thompson for the
“pleading theory”).
Holding that the Idaho Constitution’s double jeopardy protection is entirely
different from the United States Constitution, and based on a completely
different rationale, is unwarranted where there has been no clear statement by
the Idaho Supreme Court that the Idaho Constitution requires otherwise and no
Idaho statute can compel a constitutional separate “pleading theory” analysis.

This statement in Moad by the Idaho Court of Appeals that Thompson stands
for the proposition that the “pleading theory” is based on the Idaho Constitution is
not supported by the holding in Thompson. (See supra).
4
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The state, therefore, submits that the sole test for determining whether two
separate offenses may be pursued in a single prosecution is the test articulated
in Blockburger.
The Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause allows conviction and
punishment for multiple offenses arising from single acts if the legislature so
intended. A “pleading theory” of double jeopardy is inconsistent with the federal
test to the extent it relies solely on the pleadings of the prosecutor without regard
to legislative intent. It is difficult to conceive how a defendant’s constitutional
rights are based solely on how a prosecutor chooses to draft a complaint.
Because the “pleading theory” does not articulate a separate double
jeopardy protection under the Idaho Constitution, Sepulveda has failed to show
his constitutional protections against double jeopardy were violated when the
district court entered convictions for felony intimidation of a witness and
misdemeanor attempted violation of a no contact order.

5

Having failed to make

that showing, Sepulveda has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating
fundamental error. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.

5

Even if the “pleading theory” is applied, Sepulveda failed to show that felony
intimidation of a witness is a lesser included offense of misdemeanor attempted
violation of a no contact order. (See Resp. Br., pp. 28-34.)

18

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the
District Court.
DATED this 13th day of July, 2016.
__/s/ Ted S. Tollefson___
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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